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Child Abuse, Incarceration,
and Decisions About Lifesustaining Treatment

Paul C. Mann, MD,a Elliott Mark Weiss, MD, MSME,b Rebecca R. Seltzer, MD,c,d
Rachel A.B. Dodge, MD, MPH,c Renee D. Boss, MD, MHS,c,d John D. Lantos, MDe

Most critical care interventions for children occur in the framework of a
supportive environment with loving parents that are present at the bedside
to help to guide medical interventions through shared decision-making.
What happens, however, if the parents are precluded from being at the
bedside because of legal entanglements? How should clinical decisions
progress in those cases? In this Ethics Rounds, we present the case of an
infant with severe hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy at birth whose mother
was incarcerated shortly after delivery. We explore clinical and legal
challenges that the medical team faces in determining best interests for the
infant in this context and difficulties in deciding what therapies to provide
and for how long.
Decisions about withdrawing lifesustaining treatment of infants with
hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy
are complex. Prognostication can
be difficult in infancy. Parents are
emotionally stressed. Such decisions
become exponentially more difficult
when the cause of the encephalopathy
may be related to medical neglect and
the mother is charged with a crime
and imprisoned. In this article, we
present such a case and analyze the
intertwined legal and ethical issues.

THE CASE
An infant is precipitously born at
term after a pregnancy complicated
by no prenatal care, maternal illicit
substance abuse, and meconium
aspiration syndrome. Apgar scores
were 0/0/2, and the infant has
profound acidosis, hypoxia, and
multiorgan system failure after
delivery. Therapeutic hypothermia
is initiated, and extracorporeal
membrane oxygenation is considered
because of unremitting pulmonary

hypertension. However, the infant
is independently deemed not to
be a candidate for extracorporeal
membrane oxygenation by 2
separate quaternary medical centers
because of the concern for severe
hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy
with potential devastating
neurodevelopmental impacts.

As a warrant had previously been
issued for her arrest, the infant’s
mother is incarcerated after her
hospital discharge. She faces new
charges for felony drug possession.
She is also charged with child
endangerment because she had had a
rupture of membranes 2 days before
seeking medical treatment and an
illicit substance in her possession on
arrival to the labor and delivery unit.
She has been informed if the infant
dies she will face additional, more
serious charges to the extent that
the law will allow in the state. Child
Protective Services (CPS) has chosen
to sever all parental rights with the
exception of medical decision-making.
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ETHICS ROUNDS

She is not being allowed to visit the
child and can only be reached by
prearranged phone calls, but she
repeatedly expresses that all lifesupportive therapies continue with
the exception of chest compressions
were the infant to require
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The
infant’s paternity is in question,
and no other family members have
attempted to contact the medical
team or visit the infant.

The infant is 2 weeks old and remains
ventilator dependent with high
respiratory support needs, renal
dysfunction, and labile vital signs.
The infant has regained minimal
neurologic function principally
limited to basic brainstem reflexes.
Neurology consultants have reviewed
the progression of results of EEG
studies over the past few days
and believe that the neurologic
outcome will be decidedly poor with
no meaningful recovery moving
forward. The mother continues to be
held in custody, pending the outcome
of her infant.
Who should make decisions
regarding life support for this infant?

PAUL C. MANN, MD, COMMENTS
Parents are presumed to be the
appropriate surrogate decision
makers for their children until
doctors suspect and judges agree
that they are not acting in the
best interest of the child. In this
case, the mother’s failure to seek
medical care after her rupture of
membranes, in concert with her
presumed illicit substance abuse
and the previous warrant for her
arrest, led to an incarceration after
delivery. In situations of parental
arrest, medical decision-making
authority is not automatically
terminated, but imprisonment
precludes their abilities to be present
for medical office visits and/or at
the bedside during hospitalization.
The medical team can reach the
mother by phone, but the state is
2

preventing any face-to-face meetings.
This could contribute to a lack of
understanding of her infant’s grim
neurodevelopmental and clinical
prognosis.

The criminal charges of medical
neglect for her behavior during
pregnancy are ethically troubling.
Many groups, including the
Association of Women’s Health,
Obstetric and Neonatal Nurses; the
American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists; and the American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) oppose
laws that criminalize maternal
behaviors during pregnancy.1
Expectant mothers are typically given
wide latitude to make decisions, even
when obstetricians and pediatricians
disagree with those decisions. Courts
rarely intervene in such cases, even
when the birth outcome could be
jeopardized. Pregnant women have
the same rights as other adults to
make medical decisions. A courtordered cesarean delivery would
be coercive. Doctors who perform
one without a court order could
be committing battery. So, the first
important point in this case is that
mothers should not end up in jail as
a result of birth outcomes.

In addition, the mother in this case
wants what many reasonable parents
want in similar circumstances. In
cases of severe hypoxic-ischemic
encephalopathy at birth, parents
frequently require weeks of
supportive clinical counseling to
cope with the sudden tragedy of an
unexpected birth outcome and accept
the profound neurodevelopmental
impairments that may result.
Some parents make the difficult
choice to withhold or withdraw
life-supportive therapies. Others
ultimately pursue more aggressive
medical interventions.2 Diekema and
Wilfond3 support a compassionate
approach to parental decisionmaking in these contexts, allowing
for significant latitude in decisions
the medical team might not agree
with even when neurodevelopmental

impairments may be profound.
Wilkinson4 suggests a thoughtful
assessment of the benefits and
burdens of continued medical
intervention before considering
whether it may be appropriate to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
therapies. In this case, continued
mechanical ventilatory support risks
a future with profound neurologic
impairments and potential suffering
lived separate from the loving
support of a birth family. This is a
future that many reasonable people
would consider to be not in the
child’s interests.

Such deference to parents is based
on the recognition that parents bear
the impacts of their choices. But that
is not true in this case. The state has
(at least temporarily) severed all
maternal rights to her infant with
the exception of medical decisionmaking. Although she may grieve a
life with substantial disability for her
child, she will not be responsible for
caring for her infant at home in the
foreseeable future, if ever.

Her choice to continue life-sustaining
treatment of her child, then, could
be based on 1 of 3 hopes. She could
wish to continue life-sustaining
treatment because (1) she hopes and
believes that her infant might have a
meaningful neurologic recovery, (2)
she believes that her infant’s quality
of life will be good enough even with
profound disability, or (3) she fears
the criminal implications for herself if
the infant dies.
Unfortunately, the medical team
is precluded from assessing the
mother. With no other surrogate
decision makers available to guide
therapy, providers are left to weigh
the burden of continued medical
intervention against the significant
possibility of ongoing suffering with
uncertain benefit. In the end, taking
no legal action to remove maternal
medical decision-making will result
in a medically complex infant with
profound neurologic impairments
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being cared for in the state foster
care system.

The medical team has an obligation
to advocate for the child. In this case,
that means that they should petition
the court to appoint a guardian ad
litem (GAL) whose task will be to
independently consider what is in
the child’s best interest and then
on the basis of that assessment
make recommendations to the court
about whether to discontinue lifesupportive interventions.

ELLIOTT M. WEISS, MD, MSME,
COMMENTS
To start, it may be helpful to
have some background on both
the criminalization of actions by
pregnant women against their
fetus and terminology related to
parental rights. I will then make
2 recommendations for clinicians
confronted by such situations.

A few states criminalize drug use by
pregnant women.5 An amendment
to the Tennessee fetal assault law
made it a crime to give birth to a child
with neonatal abstinence syndrome.
Alabama’s chemical endangerment
laws have been interpreted to
include drug use during pregnancy.
Proponents of such laws suggest that
they deter drug use, punish criminals,
and protect fetuses and the children
that they will become. Opponents
believe that such laws deter women
seeking prenatal care. Opponents
also point out that the laws are
implemented in ways that exacerbate
social, economic, and racial
disparities. As noted above, most
professional medical organizations
(including the American Medical
Association and the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists)
are against the criminal prosecution
of pregnant women who use illegal
drugs.6– 8 But some legislators take a
different view.9
In the United States, there is a
constitutional right to parent one’s
children.10 Parental rights include

the right to make medical decisions.
Parents are assumed to be in a better
position than anybody else to know
and decide what is best for their
children. But such a prioritization
makes sense only if we assume (as is
generally the case) that parents have
an ongoing relationship with their
children.
In the current case, that is unlikely.
The medical team has been told this
mother can have no contact with her
infant, presumably forever. Yet she
still maintains control of medical
decision-making. The law, in this
case, is a mess. But it is the law.

So what can the medical team do?
First, the medical team should
request a CPS appointment of a GAL
as soon as possible. This action ought
to be seen as much-needed advocacy
for the infant. The mother has a clear
conflict of interest because of legal
ramifications to her that might result
from the child’s outcome. This action
also reflects a recognition that the
medical team may also not be the
best advocate for the child. Clinician
theorizing about potential (bad)
futures for this infant (the unloved
and abandoned bedbound child, the
taxpayer burden, or the adopted
child who ruins a marriage) can risk
skewed judgment.

Although a GAL may decrease some
decisional burden on the clinicians,
he or she does not eliminate it.
Difficult decisions must still be
made. The medical team must help
the GAL by determining what not to
offer. This may include ≥3 classes
of interventions: acute lifesaving
interventions (extracorporeal life
support and/or dialysis), treatment
of unremitting disease with no
potential path forward (inhaled nitric
oxide for pulmonary hypertension),
and life-extending treatments
in the setting of a devastating
outcome (surgical feeding tube,
ventriculoperitoneal shunt, and/or
tracheostomy).

This case should also be brought
to the hospital ethics committee.
Difficult decisions are better
when made jointly. The benefits
of decisions by committee
include reaching a better decision
(potentially) and limiting decisional
burden from overwhelming a single
individual. A committee could offer
a range of opinions about whether
the benefits of different treatments
outweigh the risks and burdens. In
this case, the treating neonatologist,
the rest of the medical team, and the
infant would all benefit from seeking
guidance from others whether
through a formal ethics consultation
or ethics committee referral or
through informal discussion with
trusted colleagues.

Individuals in the United States
who use illicit substances face
massive social, legal, and economic
consequences. For pregnant women,
the risks are high. As medical
providers, we must do our best
to support the mother-child dyad
within the confines of local law and
current societal realities. The GAL
can be a tool to assist us. We should
not hesitate to use this resource. We
must not hesitate to ask for help even
when we feel confident that we are
making a reasonable choice.

REBECCA R. SELTZER, MD, RACHEL
A.B. DODGE, MD, MPH, AND RENEE D.
BOSS, MD, MHS, COMMENT
We find 3 important questions in the
case: (1) Did the mother’s actions
constitute child abuse and warrant
severing of her parental rights? (2)
If so, why are her medical decisionmaking rights retained? (3) How
should decision-making proceed to
represent this infant’s best interests?

First, the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act mandates reports to
CPS when a substance-exposed infant
is born.11 There is substantial state by
state variability in how this mandate
is interpreted and implemented. As
of 2018, 24 states and the District
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of Columbia consider prenatal
substance use to be child abuse
and allow for its use as grounds for
termination of parental rights.12 The
termination of parental rights is a
civil, not criminal, proceeding. Only 2
states, Alabama and South Carolina,
have upheld criminal charges against
women related to substance use
during pregnancy.13
In this case, prenatal substance use
seems to be one of the grounds used
as justification to sever parental
rights. The second question that
arises then is as follows: If a state
feels a parent is so unfit that he or
she should lose his or her parental
rights (even the right to visit his
or her infant in the hospital), why
should that parent be allowed to
make high-stakes medical decisions?
This practice has little variability
among states. When a state initially
determines by clear and convincing
evidence that a parent is unfit, it
usually terminates physical custody.
The child is removed from the
parent’s home and placed in an
environment that promotes safety
and well-being. But parents often
retain legal authority to make
medical decisions until a decision is
made in the judicial process about
the termination of all parental rights.
That can take months or years. The
mother in this case will rarely or
never see her infant or interact with
clinicians, but she will still direct
preference-sensitive decisions such
as the use of chronic ventilation or
surgical feeding tubes.

The AAP supports this approach
and states the process for decisionmaking about life-sustaining medical
therapies (LSMTs) for victims of
severe child abuse should be similar
to that of all other critically ill
children.6 This includes treating the
parents with respect and compassion
and including them in serious
medical decisions. Sometimes, this
approach leads to questions about
whether such parents are making
decisions that protect the child.
4

So we reach our third question:
How should decision-making
proceed to incorporate the child’s
medical status, prognosis, and
the family’s values?14 Parents are
given authority to direct serious
decisions under the assumption that
they love their child and will make
decisions on the basis of the child’s
best interests. A parent’s ability to
do this may be compromised by an
inadequate understanding of the
child’s condition or by conflicting
interests.15 Both factors are relevant
to this case. Because the mother
cannot visit her infant, it seems
unlikely that she has a meaningful
understanding of her infant’s
complex medical status or prognosis.
And, because her criminal charges
are contingent on whether her infant
lives or dies, she has an inherent
conflict of interest in making medical
decisions that could end the infant’s
life. In cases in which LSMT decisions
must be made and the parent
has a conflict of interest, the AAP
recommends that a GAL be appointed
as an objective voice and advocate for
the child’s best interests.
A mediator, such as an ethics
consultant, should facilitate
communication among the involved
parties about this infant’s best
interests. If the mother is deemed
a competent decision maker, then
state laws require her involvement
regardless of concerns about her
ability to act as a meaningful parent.
If the medical team and ethics
committee believe that she is
acting against her infant’s best
interest even after they have taken
time to educate her and explore
her motivations, they should
communicate that to the GAL. The
GAL may recommend continued
treatment. Or, even without the
recommendation, the judge may be
reluctant to withdraw LSMTs from a
child without parental consent.
With this case, we highlight several
laws, policies, and practices that

do not take the infant’s best
interests into account and should be
reconsidered.

1. Punitive laws may have actually
caused this infant’s poor outcome
by deterring prenatal care.
Efforts should be focused on
encouraging high-quality prenatal
care and treatment resources and
support for pregnant mothers
who use illicit substances rather
than instilling fear of legal
ramifications.16

2. Despite the inherent conflict of
interest, it is standard of care to
allow parents to retain medical
decision-making rights after
charges of harm and/or abuse.
If a parent is deemed unfit to
have physical custody of a child
because of concerns for safety
and well-being, then allowing that
parent to make medical decisions
may be detrimental to the child’s
well-being.
3. If decision-making authority is
retained, as it was in this case,
then preventing the parent from
visiting the child’s bedside or
openly communicating with
the medical team undermines
the decision maker’s ability
to make an informed decision
that represents the child’s best
interests. Perhaps there would be
no conflict between the mother
and team if these barriers were
removed. If conflicts still persist,
then using a GAL is likely the best
option.

CASE RESOLUTION
At 3 weeks of life, the infant
remained ventilator dependent
with no purposeful responses to
serial neurologic examinations and
worsening renal failure. Repeated
attempts were made to communicate
the grave nature of the clinical
progress to the mother and CPS.
Despite these conversations, no
additional code limitations were set

Downloaded from www.aappublications.org/news by guest on January 21, 2020

MANN et al

in place. After a lengthy discussion
with the ethics committee and legal
counsel, the institution elected to
petition the local court to completely
terminate maternal rights and
appoint a legal guardian. The courts
were in the process of appointing
that guardian when the infant had
a sudden clinical deterioration.
The infant died without receiving
cardiopulmonary resuscitation.

JOHN D. LANTOS, MD, COMMENTS

There is a legal maxim that “bad
cases create bad law.” This case
reveals ways in which bad law
can lead to bad cases. Many of the
problems in this case were legally
iatrogenic. This mother clearly had
serious substance abuse problems.
Laws criminalizing her behavior
likely led her to avoid necessary
prenatal care. With better prenatal
care, the infant might not have
suffered the perinatal insult.
Then, the laws made it difficult to
include the mother in decisionmaking and created a legal conflict
of interest (when there need not
have been any) that further
undermined her perceived
reliability. Such laws have
enormous costs and no benefits.
They reflect the attitude that
substance abuse makes pregnant
women less than human. They
disparage pregnant women and
harm infants. Given this toxic legal
environment, the doctors in this case
did the best that they could.
All of the cases in Ethics Rounds
are based on real events. Some
incorporate elements of a number
of different cases in order to better
highlight a specific ethical dilemma.

ABBREVIATIONS
AAP: A
 merican Academy of
Pediatrics
CPS: C
 hild Protective Services
GAL: g uardian ad litem
LSMT: life-sustaining medical
therapy
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